Ai Weiwei: "The Internet is uncontrollable, freedom will win" | TheNextWeb

It’s easy to forget that Ai Weiwei is an artist, at times. The man who is so often (and rightly) described as ‘outspoken’ and a ‘dissident’ is one of the most vocal critics of the Chinese regime, particularly on the subject of Internet censorship, to the point that it tends to overshadow his work.

Ai, who famously designed the Beijing ‘Birds Nest’ Olympic stadium, something he now regrets, discusses the Chinese government and its attitude to technology and the Web in a new op-ed published by The Guardian.

In the article, that is also available in Chinese, Ai looks at the affect that the Great Firewall censorship has had on China. An avid user of Twitter — @awiwi – he pens an argument that, in the long term, China’s can’t keep the power of the Internet at bay forever.

The government is certainly doing its best to provide that theory wrong. Its heightened efforts to quash ‘harmful information online’ have seen it implement a identification verification policy for microblogs (albeit loosely so far) and make arrests, close websites and restrict Twitter-like services following excessive political speculation last month.

“[China] blocks major internet platforms – such as Twitter and Facebook – because it is afraid of free discussion,” Ai says. “And it deletes information. The government computer has one button: delete.”

Ai compares China’s Web effort to the construction of a dam:

China may seem quite successful in its controls, but it has only raised the water level. It’s like building a dam: it thinks there is more water so it will build it higher. But every drop of water is still in there. It doesn’t understand how to let the pressure out. It builds up a way to maintain control and push the problem to the next generation.

Ultimately, he believes, this approach will see the Internet and freedom “win” in the communist country:

It still hasn’t come to the moment that [the regime] will collapse. That makes a lot of other states admire its technology and methods. But in the long run, its leaders must understand it’s not possible for them to control the internet unless they shut it off – and they can’t live with the consequences of that. The internet is uncontrollable. And if the internet is uncontrollable, freedom will win. It’s as simple as that.

The over-arching effect of China’s Internet freedom, Ai says, impacts on more than just civil liberties, it also blocks creativity, leaving China “far behind” other nations, he says.

For example, while those in the US discuss the (unlikely) possibility that Apple might bring its operation and manufacturing plants to the US, China’s dream is for the design of the device, and others like it, to come from within the Asian country.

Ai believes that the flagship Apple smartphone is  ”an understanding of human nature” and therefore it cannot be conceived from within China, he argues:

If a person has never had the right to choose their information, freely associate with any kind of ideology, and develop an individual character with some passion and imagination – how can they become creative?

Ai is unique in not being afraid to criticise, and be seen criticising, China. Consequently, his vocal comments have seen him handed a series of stiff punishments from authorities.

At its worst, he was detained for 81 days last year after a series of comments, released after apparently confessing his crimes. Though initially forbidden to return to social media, Ai quickly returned to his regular diet of Twitter and its Chinese equivalent Sina Weibo.

Last year he was hit by a massive $2 million tax bill but his supports used social media to rally round and collect donations to help pay it.

His latest scuffle with authorities saw the state order him to switch off a series of surveillance cameras that the artist had set up across his home. Ai had made the feed freely available online from April 2 to mark a year since his detention.

It remains to be seen how his latest article will be received by authorities in China and whether there will be further punishment dealt out to Ai Weiwei for his criticisms.

The full opinion article is most definitely worth reading, you can find it here.

via thenextweb.com

Very interesting perspective on the current state and future of Internet freedom in China.

Wen Jiabao attacks party conservatives on the way out the door | via @FinancialTimes

(Source: FT.com)

©Getty

Chinese premier Wen Jiabao fired a parting shot at conservative officials in the ruling Communist party, warning them that China could face another Cultural Revolution unless it undertakes urgent political reforms.

 

“Without successful political structural reform, it is impossible for us to fully institute economic structural reform and the gains we have made in this area may be lost,” Mr Wen said at his farewell briefing at the National People’s Congress, China’s rubber stamp parliament which meets for just 10 days every year.

 

More

ON THIS STORY

• Splits surface in China leadership fight
• Comment Talking about a cultural revolution
• Wealth gap on display at China’s parliament
• China ditches double-digit growth
• Wen Jiabao to visit Gulf energy powers

ON THIS TOPIC

• Factional fights continue despite dismissal
• Downfall ends Bo’s ambition to rule China
• Global Insight China needs to match words with actions
• China offers other Brics renminbi loans

IN CHINA

• Bo purged by Chinese leadership
• China’s rare earth stranglehold in spotlight
• China’s Bo dismisses downfall rumours
• China tycoon may yet gain Iceland foothold

“New problems that have cropped up in Chinese society will not be fundamentally resolved and such a historical tragedy as the Cultural Revolution may happen again,” the premier added, in remarks that were broadcast live on national television. “The mistake of the Cultural Revolution and impact of feudalism are yet to be fully eliminated.”

 

Mr Wen, who will step down from the party’s powerful politburo standing committee later this year, directed his aim at rivals including Bo Xilai.

Mr Bo is the ruling party official in Chongqing, a large city in southwest China, and a candidate for promotion to the top ranks of the party in the upcoming leadership transition. His propects, however, have been damaged by a recent scandal involving Chongqing’s former police chief.

 

Mr Wen’s references to the anarchy of the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution, during which millions of people were persecuted and perished, appeared to be a swipe at the “Cultural Revolution-style” campaigns organised by Mr Bo in Chongqing. The campaigns evoke revolutionary, or “red”, propaganda and ostensibly target organised crime.

 

In another rare example of open criticism among senior Communist party officials, Mr Wen also addressed the scandal that brought down Mr Bo’s former police chief and political ally, Wang Lijun, who tried to defect to the US last month. Mr Wang is in custody and his case is under investigation.

“The current [Chongqing] party committee and government of Chongqing must seriously reflect on the Wang Lijun incident and learn lessons from this incident,” Mr Wen said.

 

As Mr Wen and President Hu Jintao prepare to make way for a new generation of leaders in a once-in-a-decade reshuffle, the country’s political elite are engaged in internecine strugglesthat will determine the national agenda for years to come. Mr Bo has been angling for a place on the nine-person Politburo standing committee, the Communist party’s most powerful body.

 

“There are obviously some conflicts [among China’s political elite], with the most important conflicts related to the distribution of power within the party,” said He Weifang, a law professor at Beijing University. “There are also different views over how to solve China’s social problems, including the wealth distribution problem, corruption and China’s relations with the outside world.”

 

During a three-hour press conference, Mr Wen outlined a liberal reform agenda, including gradual steps towards direct elections. While Mr Wen has commented about the need for such reform before, he has rarely done so in such forceful language.

 

Asked whether China would hold general elections to choose its leaders, Mr Wen said he believed lower-level village elections should be expanded to towns and counties: “The democratic system of China will continue to move forward in keeping with China’s national conditions and no force will be able to hold this process back.”

 

Referring to the wave of uprisings sweeping across the Middle East, Mr Wen was more emphatic in his support for free elections. “The demand for democracy by the Arab people must be respected and truly responded to,” he said. “I believe this trend towards democracy cannot be held back by any force.”

 

Mr Wen has often been criticised for failing to match his rhetoric with action. He alluded to this criticism on Wednesday, blaming “institutional and other factors” for his inability to push through some policies and reforms. He also referred to unspecified “slander” directed at him personally and said these attacks made him “worried about society”.

 

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A Political Shocker in China Has Implications for the Economy | via @bloomberg

[[posterous-content:pid___0]]In a terse announcement, China’s official Xinhua News Agency announced March 15 that the charismatic Chongqing party leader and princeling, Bo Xilai, has been replaced. It is the biggest setback for a senior Chinese Communist Party leader since at least the sacking of former Shanghai party secretary Chen Liangyu in a corruption scandal in 2006. “Bo will no longer serve as
secretary, standing committee member, or member of the CPC Chongqing municipal committee,” according to the Xinhua announcement.

While Bo is still listed on a government website as one of the 25 members of China’s ruling Politburo, it is unclear whether he will also have to step down from that body. Even if he doesn’t, Bo’s political future seems finished, and his once-likely appointment to the nine-member Standing Committee of the Politburo—with seven positions up for grabs this fall in a major leadership transition—is finished.

While some see the fall of Bo as a setback for princelings, or the children of early revolutionary leaders, others see his downfall stemming from a more generalized resistance in the ruling party to Bo’s swashbuckling, nontraditional campaign style—in essence, his use of populism and personality to try to win promotion to the top echelons of Chinese leadership. “Some leaders have been very nervous about Bo Xilai’s self-promotional campaign. They see it as a possible effort to establish a political kingdom to challenge Beijing,” says Cheng Li, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington.

The 62-year-old party leader’s demise also suggests significant resistance to what some had started calling the Chongqing model. That’s usually seen as an approach to running the political economy that advocates conservative values, including the singing of “red songs” from China’s Maoist past, as well as an aggressive crackdown on crime. Bo’s assault on crime, a campaign called “dahei”—literally, “hit black”—put 2,000 people in jail in the southwestern municipality of 30 million people. These moves raised the ire of some Chinese intellectuals and party members, who saw them as a regressive step back to a less open, and more dogma-ruled China.

The Chongqing model also includes a focus on state-led control of the economy, a return to government-owned companies that dominate the business world, as well as policies aimed at combatting China’s growing inequality, including by building subsidized housing for the poor. On March 9, on the sidelines of the National People’s Congress, Bo said that China’s gini coefficient, an index of income inequality, had exceeded 0.46, well above the level that most economists say leads to social unrest. “As Chairman Mao said as he was building the nation, the goal of our building a socialist society is to make sure that everyone has a job to do and food to eat, that everybody is wealthy together,” Bo said. “If only a few people are rich, then we’ll slide into capitalism. We’ve failed. If a new capitalist class is created, then we’ll really have turned onto a wrong road.”

In pointed comments during a press conference the day before Bo’s dismissal, outgoing premier Wen Jiabao took aim at the soon-to-be deposed princeling and his policies (Wen very likely already knew of Bo’s fate; the decision to replace Bo would almost certainly require lengthy discussions by China’s Standing Committee in the days proceeding the move). “The current party committee and government in Chongqing must seriously reflect on the Wang Lijun incident,” he said, referring to Bo’s former chief of police, who, after taking temporary refuge in the American consulate in Chengdu, Sichuan, last month, is now under investigation and has been relieved of his previous positions.

“I want to say a few words at this point,” Wen continued, before launching into a spirited defense of the need for continued economic reform. “Our country’s modernization drive has made great achievements. Yet at the same  time, we’ve also taken detours and have learned hard lessons,” the 69-year-old Wen said. “In particular, we’ve taken the major decision of conducting reform and opening up in China, a decision that’s crucial for China’s future and destiny. What has happened shows that any practice that we take must be based on the experience and lessons we’ve gained from history, and it must serve the people’s interests.”

Wen also made an appeal for political reform, saying that without it, China could once again experience a “tragedy” like the Cultural Revolution. His reference to the decade-long era of Mao excesses seemed also to be criticism directed at Bo’s recent campaigns. “Reform can only go forward and must not stand still or go backward, because that offers no way out,” he said. “Without successful political reform, it’s impossible for China to fully institute economic reform, and the gains we have made in these areas may be lost.”

“It was a very, very powerful statement. It was the clearest, most comprehensive statement talking about the necessity of political reform in China,” says the Brookings Institution’s Li. To Bo’s Chongqing model, “there is a linkage absolutely. Chongqing’s approach is ultimately anti-democratic, and it is very dangerous. Wen was saying that political institutionalization or Chinese-style democracy, not red terror, should be the way forward for China,” says Li.

Bo was replaced as party secretary by 65-year-old Vice Premier Zhang Dejiang, a less well-known senior Politburo member. The native of China’s northeastern Liaoning province has a decidedly mixed background: He earned a degree in economics from North Korea’s Kim Il Sung University, hardly a place where one is likely to acquire a reformist bent. But Zhang also served from 1998 to 2007 as party secretary of Zhejiang and Guangdong, respectively, two of China’s most open provinces, albeit doing little there to distinguish his tenure. The Brookings Institution says this promotion increases Zhang’s chance of winning an eventual appointment to the Standing Committee.

More tantalizing is what the sacking might mean for the future of presumed Bo rival and, at 57, relatively youthful Guangdong party secretary Wang Yang. Bo’s dismissal could open up a slot for Wang in the top leadership body but also could hamper his prospects if the elite or princeling faction lashes out at Wang in retaliation, says Li.

In recent years, Wang has earned a reformist reputation running China’s export-oriented southern province. In particular, his handling of labor strikes that have swept the Pearl River Delta, including the spring 2010 Honda strike in which he personally intervened (he is believed to support reforms to China’s usually toothless official union, including allowing workers to elect their own representatives), as well as his dealing with the Wukan Village movement last year, has encouraged those hoping for a more politically open younger generation of leaders taking over in China.

Still, the sentiments driving much of what has been identified with the Chongqing model are unlikely to go away with Bo’s departure, says Patrick Chovanec, a business professor at Tsinghua University in Beijing. “Bo was hopping onto some broader trends that exist in the Chinese economy and society, especially in the wake of the global financial crisis. Those include greater skepticism about the market, embracing the role of the state in the economy, and concerns about income inequality,” he says. “The things that made [the Chongqing model] so attractive to so many people are still very real for many in China today.”

By Dexter Roberts on March 15, 2012

(Source: Bloomberg BusinessWeek)

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U.S. ambassador: Political situation in China “very, very delicate” | The Cable

The Chinese people are increasingly frustrated with the Chinese Communist Party and the political situation in China is "very, very delicate," U.S. Ambassador to China Gary Locke said on Wednesday.

"I do believe that there is a power of the people, and there is a growing frustration among the people over the operations of government, corruption, lack of transparency, and issues that affect the Chinese people on a daily basis that they feel are being neglected," Locke told NPR's Steve Inskeep during a Wednesday interview, part of a media blitz Locke is conducting during his visit to Washington.

"Do you think that the situation is fundamentally stable in China right now?" Inskeep asked Locke.

"I think, very delicate -- very, very delicate," Locke responded. "But there were calls earlier this year for a Jasmine Revolution and nothing came of it. I think it would take something very significant, internal to China, to cause any type of major upheaval."

Locke said that since he took over the ambassadorship from former GOP presidential candidate Jon Huntsman, he has become aware of public demonstrations large and small throughout China that ordinary people were using to pressure the government to address their grievances. He singled out a recent protest in the southern Chinese city of Wukan over the confiscation of land without reasonable compensation.

"[The people] basically prevented anybody from the outside from coming in and brought the city to a halt and forced the Chinese government communist leaders to send people to address their grievances," Locke said.

The discord inside China is partly a result of the income and wealth disparity between China's growing middle class and the masses of poor, rural residents, Locke said. He also said the Chinese government's human rights record was worsening.

"[I]t's very clear that in the run up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics and since then, there's been a greater intolerance of dissent -- and the human rights record of China has been going in the wrong direction," said Locke.

Asked for comment at today's State Department press briefing, spokeswoman Victoria Nuland backed up Locke's comments on human rights and the rule of law in China.

"[Locke] obviously speaks for the administration in expressing continued concern that we seem to have an increasing trend of crackdowns, forced disappearances, extralegal detentions, arrests and convictions of human rights activists, lawyers, religious leaders, ethnic minorities in China," she said.

But Nuland declined to repeat Locke's assertion that the Chinese government was potentially unstable.

"I think our message to the Chinese government on these issues is the same message that we give around the world when we have human rights concerns, that governments are stronger when they protect the human rights of their people and when they allow for peaceful dissent," she said.

via thecable.foreignpolicy.com

This is a very interesting comment from the US Ambassador to China and with the pending transfer of power to the next generation of Communist Party leadership the country could be poised for its largest political upheaval decades.

Latest Directives From the Ministry of Truth, March 10-18, 2011

The following examples of censorship instructions, issued to the media and/or Internet companies by various central (and sometimes local) government authorities, have been leaked and distributed online. Chinese journalists and bloggers often refer to those instructions as “Directives from the Ministry of Truth.” CDT has collected the selections we translate here from a variety of sources and has checked them against official Chinese media reports to confirm their implementation

State Council Information Office: Article from China-Tibet Web

March 18, 2011

From the State Council Information Office: All websites are requested to repost, in its entirety and in a prominent location, the article from China-Tibet Web, “Can Seeds of Enmity Bear Fruits of Harmony?”  It is not permitted to change the title, and the article must remain up until March 19, 10:00 am.

国新办：中国西藏网文章

国新办：请各地网站在首页最醒目区统一转发中国西藏网的《仇恨的种子能结出和谐的果实吗》一文，不可改标题，并且保留到19日10时。

State Council Information Office: Radiation Levels in Urban Areas

March 16, 2011

From the State Council Information Office: Starting on March 17, all websites are requested to prominently repost on their front pages information regarding radiation levels in main urban areas, provided by the Environmental Protection Department.  This information must be placed in a fixed location, and note that it must be updated every day.  All provincial-level Internet surveillance and propaganda Departments are requested to strictly examine websites under their jurisdiction, and strictly enforce the demands of this notice.

Every day, all websites that provide cell-phone reports must also issue, “Daily Radiation Levels in Main Urban Areas From the Environmental Protection Department (Office of National Nuclear Safety).”  All mobile phone companies must understand that this is a political duty, and immediately implement it.

国新办：城市环境辐射水平

国新办：所有网站请从3月17日起在首页要闻区突出转发环保部发布的全国主要城市环境辐射水平信息，此信息必须置于固定位置，注意每日必须进行更新。各省网管，网宣部门请严格检查属地网站，对照本要求严格执行。

所有设有手机报的网站，也需要每天转发“环境保护部（国家核安全局）发布每日全国主要城市环境辐射水平”。所有手机运营商必须理解这是政治任务，立即执行。

Central Propaganda Department: Property Taxes

March 14, 2011

From the Central Propaganda Department: Regarding Shanghai’s and Chongqing’s experiments with initiating property taxes, opinions that property taxes steal money are not to be reported or hyped.

国新办：房产税

中宣部：对上海重庆启动房产税试点，说房产税是抢钱的言论不报道不炒作

State Council Information Office: Unilateralism, Hillary Clinton style

March 14, 2011

From the State Council Information Office: All websites are requested to repost, on the front page and in a prominent position, the story, “Internet Freedom: Unilateralism, Hillary Clinton style.”  It is not permitted to change the title, and the article must stay on the front page until March 15, 6:00 am.

国新办：希拉里式的单边主义

国新办：请各网站在首页最醒目位置转载“互联网自由：希拉里式的单边主义”，不可以改标题，文章必须保持在首页至3月15日晚6时。

State Council Information Office: Concern and Love for Tibetan Students

State Council Information Office: Concern and Love for Tibetan Students

State Council Information Office: All websites must post on their front page news section the article, “For 33 years, 75-year-old Professor Yang Changlin has Shown Concern and Love for Tibetan College Students in Almost 10,000 Instances.” Leave this article up until the day after tomorrow (the 15th) at 6 pm.

国新办：请各网站在首页要闻区突出转发《75岁教授杨昌林33年如一日关爱高校藏族学生近万人次》，保留至后天（15日）下午六时。

March 13, 2011

From the State Council Information Office:

Central Propaganda Department: Large Earthquake in Japan

March 13, 2011

From the Central Propaganda Department: Media must solidly grasp reporting on disaster conditions after the large earthquake in Japan, and objectively and quickly report on trends as they develop.  Place particular emphasis on grasping the relationship between anti-seismic and relief efforts for the Japan and Yunnan earthquakes and propaganda reporting for the national meetings of the “Two Congresses.”  Do not weaken the theme of reporting on the Two Congresses.

We must fully propagandize the state of the rescue work that our teams have initiated in Japan.  We must closely follow the circumstances of Chinese people and overseas Chinese in Japan.

Do not deliberately criticize or champion the actions of the Japanese government, and do not make any comparisons with anti-seismic and rescue efforts in our country.  Give scientific explanations of the explosions and leaks at the nuclear facilities.  Do not play up or casually speculate and analyze the influence of leaks on China.

中宣部：日本特大地震

中宣部：媒体要稳妥把握对日本特大地震灾情报道，客观，及时报道灾情动态信息。注意把握好日本地震和云南地震的抗震救灾和全国两会宣传报道的关系。不要冲淡了两会报道的主题。

要充分宣传好我救援队在日本开展救援的情况。要密切关注我在日华人，华侨的情况。

不要刻意批评或赞扬日政府的有关行为，不要和我国的抗震救灾对比。对日核设施泄露及爆炸要做科学解读。不过分渲染，不随意猜测和分析泄露对我国的影响。

Central Propaganda Department: An Illegal Gathering in Shandong

March 12, 2011

From the Central Propaganda Department: On March 13, there will possibly be illegal gatherings and activities in Jinan, Qingdao, Yantai, Weifang, and Rizhao.  Do not give interviews or reports.

中宣部：山东非法集会

中宣部：3月13日济南、青岛、烟台、潍坊、日照可能有非法集会活动，不采访不报道

Central Propaganda Department: The Super Moon

March 12, 2011

From the Central Propaganda Department: Media are not to hype the super moon.  It is not permitted to draw connections between the moon, earthquake, fires, and other natural disasters.  It is allowed to use scientific explanations circulated by the Xinhua News Agency, and purely astronomical information issued by expert Departments can be published.

中宣部：超级月亮

中宣部：媒体不要炒作超级月亮。不可把超级月亮与地震，火灾等自然灾害相联系。可用新华社所发稿件做科学解读，权威部门发布的纯天文学内容可刊发。

Central Propaganda Department: Housing Rationing in Shenzhen

March 12, 2011

From the Central Propaganda Department: Media are not to hype questions about housing rationing in Qiaoxiang Village and Shenyun Village, Shenzhen.  Related information should use information from Shenzhen authorities as the standard.  Do not give independent interviews or commentary.

中宣部：深圳房屋配售

中宣部：媒体不炒作深圳侨乡村，深云村房屋配售问题，有关情况以深圳权威部门的信息为准，不自行采访和评论

Central Propaganda Department: The Yunnan Earthquake and the Two Congresses

March 12, 2011

From the Central Propaganda Department: For the Yunnan earthquake, we must mainly report on the active rescue activities of political leaders.  We absolutely must not allow the earthquakes to dilute the message of the Two Congresses.  We cannot report on representative members being absent from the meetings.

中宣部：云南地震和两会

中宣部：云南地震必须主要报道领导人积极救灾；必须不能让地震冲淡两会；必须不能报道代表委员开会缺席。

Central Propaganda Department: Cultural Industrialization

March 12, 2011

From the Central Propaganda Department: In related reports, media cannot use the term “cultural industrialization.”

中宣部：文化产业化

中宣部： 媒体在有关报道中不要使用文化产业化的提法

Central Propaganda Department: Family Planning

March 12, 2011

From the Central Propaganda Department: Media are not to hype family planning problems.  Do not report on the issue of having two children.  Policy changes on famiy planning will use information issued by authorities as the standard.

中宣部：计划生育

中宣部：媒体不得炒作计划生育问题，生二胎话题不做报道。计划生育在政策调整以权威部门发布信息为准。

The State Administration of Radio Film and Television: Direct Television Broadcasts From Outside our Borders

March 12, 2011

From The State Administration of Radio Film and Television: It is not allowed to directly broadcast television programs originating from outside our borders.  If there are currently any such broadcasts reporting on the earthquake in Japan, immediately cut them off.

广电总局：境外电视直播

广电总局：不得直播境外电视节目。如有正在进行的日本大地震相关的境外直播，请立即下线。

Central Propaganda Department: The Earthquakes in Yunnan and Japan

March 12, 2011

From the Central Propaganda Department: When reporting on the current earthquakes, media are not to compare the earthquake in Yunnan with the earthquake in Japan.

中宣部：云南和日本地震

中宣部：各媒体在报道目前地震事件的时候不得把云南地震跟日本地震做比较。

Shanghai Propaganda Department: Han Han

March 12, 2011

Shanghai Party Committee Propaganda Department: Activities and comments related to Han Han, beyond his car racing, are not to be reported.

上海宣传部：韩寒

上海市委宣传部：有关韩寒的活动和言论，除了赛车以外的不报道。

Central Propaganda Department: He Hongsang, Macau Gambling King

March 11, 2011

From the Central Propaganda Department: Do not report on the partitioning of household assets of He Hongsang, the gambling king of Macau.

中宣部：澳门赌王何鸿桑

中宣部：不报道澳门赌王何鸿桑家庭财产分割案。

Central Propaganda Department: Taxi Strike in Lanzhou

March 11, 2011

From the Central Propaganda Department: Do not report on the taxi strike in Lanzhou.

中宣部：兰州出租罢运

中宣部：不报道兰州出租车罢运事件。

Central Propaganda Department: Exchange Student in Norway Injured While Parachuting

March 11, 2011

From the Central Propaganda Department: Do not report on the incident of an exchange student in Norway injuring himself after parachuting from a tower at the Chinese Academy of Science.

中宣部：挪威留学生跳伞受伤

中宣部：不报道挪威籍留学生在中科院高塔跳伞受伤一事

Central Propaganda Department: Xu Commits Suicide

March 11, 2011

From the Central Propaganda Department: Do not report on the suicide and death of Xu, Assistant Director of the Testing Center at the National Administration College.

中宣部：徐某自杀

中宣部：不报道国家行政学院考试中心副主任徐某自杀身亡事件

Central Propaganda Department: Delegate Absences at the Two Congresses

March 11, 2011

From the Central Propaganda Department: Do not report on the absences of delegates from the Two Congresses.

中宣部：两会代表缺席

中宣部：不报道两会的代表委员开会缺席一事

Central Propaganda Department: Tax Evasion by Ma Zhongqi

March 11, 2011

From the Central Propaganda Department: Do not report on the case of tax evasion by Ma Zhongqi in Huaiyuan county, Ningxia.

中宣部：马衷琦逃税案

中宣部：不报道宁夏海源县马衷琦逃税案

Central Propaganda Department: Standardization of Proposals at the Two Congresses

March 11, 2011

From the Central Propaganda Department: Do not report on the need to standardize responses to proposals and motions at the Two Congresses.

中宣部：两会议案程序化

中宣部：不报道需将两会议案和提案回复程序化的话题

Central Propaganda Department: Coal Mining in Shanxi

March 11, 2011

From the Central Propaganda Department: Do not report on the sinkholes caused by coal mining in Shanxi.

中宣部：山西采煤

中宣部：不报道山西因采煤引发的地陷。

Central Propaganda Bureau: Mismanagement of the Automobile Industry

March 11, 2011

From the Central Propaganda Department: On March 9, China Management Report (Zhongguo jingying bao) and Southern Metropolis (Nanfang dushi bao) report on Huang Qifang’s criticism that some people have mismanaged the automobile industry.  All newspapers are not to re-publish or report the story.

中宣部：胡搞汽车业

中宣部：三月九日中国经营报和南方都市报报道黄奇帆批评有人胡搞汽车业的稿件，各报不转不报

Central Propaganda Department: Chunxiao Gas Field

March 10, 2011

From the Central Propaganda Department: Do not report on extractions in the Chunxiao gas field by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (Zhonghaiyou).

中宣部：春晓油田

中宣部：对中海油在春晓油田开采一事不做报道

In China, several political bodies are in charge of Internet content control. At the highest level, there is the Central Propaganda Department, which ensures that media and cultural content follows the official line as mandated by the CCP. Then there is the State Council Information Office (SCIO), which has established an “Internet Affairs Bureau” to oversee all Websites that publish news, including the official sites of news organizations as well as independent sites that post news content.

This “Internet Affairs Bureau,” sends out very specific instructions to all large news websites daily, and often multiple times per day. Those instructions do not always mean that related contents are completely banned online, but they instruct websites to highlight or suppress certain type of opinions or information in a very detailed manner.

Chinese journalists and bloggers often refer to those instructions, as well as other type of censorship orders to media and websites, as “Directives from the Ministry of Truth.” The Ministry of Truth (or Minitrue, in Newspeak) is one of the four ministries that govern Oceania in George Orwell’s novel Nineteen Eighty-Four. In the Chinese blogosphere, it is the online nickname for the Central Propaganda Department and generally speaking, all other subordinate propaganda agencies including Internet supervision departments.

Today, it’s been said that news does not break, it tweets. For the officials in the the Ministry of Truth, the news is that their supposedly confidential instructions get tweeted as well.

via chinadigitaltimes.net

China’s 12th Five-Year-Plan – Will It Help With the Global Trade Imbalance?

Amongst all the political upheaval in the Middle East and North Africa, with people rising against dictatorial regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and elsewhere, this week China embarked on its annual legislative session.  The legislative session of the National People’s Congress, which officially enacts legislation, will rubber-stamp the government’s 12^th Five-Year-Plan (2011-2015), which was decided at the Communist Party meeting in October, 2010.

Details won’t be made public until the conclusion of the legislative session (which usually lasts 10-14 days), but some elements of China’s next five-year economic plan have been made public.  The three elements worth highlighting are a lower growth rate and a more balanced/sustainable economic model, meaningful reductions of pollution through better energy conservation, and a more aggressive fight against inflation.

A New Growth Model:

• Set a GDP growth target of 7% (down from the current actual GDP growth rate of 10%).  To do that, the government will have to divert money away from construction and corporate subsidies, and instead use public funds to increase household incomes.

• Cut import tariffs to reduce input-costs, while boosting consumer demand and reducing China’s reliance for growth on exports which generates trade surpluses and contributes to the global trade imbalance.

• Improve the income of farmers and migrant workers, who have benefited the least from China’s phenomenal economic growth, by increasing minimum wages.  In particular, provinces across China have announced a string of double-digit wage increases this year as part of the government desire to increase incomes among the rural regions and migrant workers in the cities.

• Increase spending on health-care and full nationwide social welfare insurance to reduce the need for “precautionary savings” and encourage more Chinese consumer spending.

• Raise the minimum threshold for personal income tax.  This could exempt hundreds of millions of people from having to pay taxes, and boost household spending.

New Energy Priorities:

• Introduce targets for energy efficiency and consumption that will push China’s energy consumption from non-fossil fuel sources to 12% by 2015.  Key sectors expected to benefit include: hydro and nuclear power, power grid technology.

• In particular, there will be significant growth in nuclear power (from 10 GW to 40 GW), 63 GW of new hydroelectric power, 48 GW of wind capacity and 5 GW of solar power.  Unfortunately, coal generation will continue to provide 260 GW, although its share of China’s energy mix is expected to fall from 72% to 63%.

• Double the share of natural gas in Chinese energy consumption to 8% by 2015, up from 4% that it was last year.  This will make China a natural buyer of large quantities of Russian gas, and an inevitable competitor to Europe, which already relies heavily on gas from Russia.

• Introduce taxes of up to $820 (up from just $100) on vehicles with larger than 2 liters (energy inefficient) engines.

• Introduce a tax linked to carbon emissions, first via pilot programs in special regions and industries.

Fighting Inflation:

• The most important short-term priority for the government is to address increases in food price, which Beijing intends to do through price controls.

• In order to control inflation, the government intends to keep using the tools and methods that it has been employing thus far: manage liquidity, use price controls, curb real-estate speculation, and “adjust and improve” property tax policies.  Furthermore, the budget for this year shows a 35% increase in spending on low-income housing.

• However, no specific lending targets for banks have been outlined by the government yet.  New loans topped a 7.5 trillion RMB ($1.1 trillion) ceiling last year and excessive bank lending is considered by some to be a contributing factor to China’s inflation.

Analyst are already predicting that this Five-Year-Plan will be the most significant in China’s modern history, marking the moment that China finally decided to abandon its fast export-led growth strategy in favor for a more sustainable growth model.  However, this new effort by China to rebalance its economy in not addressing the root cause of its monetary problem (inflation), and will not facilitate the rebalancing of global trade, which has been so critical to the overall world recovery.

The root cause of China’s inflation is its weak-currency policy, which is feeding an artificially large trade surplus.  This policy hurts both China by producing an overheated, inflation-prone economy, and the rest of the world by increasing unemployment in many other countries.

Theoretically, inflation is the market’s way of undoing currency manipulation.  According to Paul Krugman, China has been using a weak currency to keep its wages and prices low in dollar terms; market forces have responded by pushing those wages and prices up, eroding that artificial competitive advantage.

China’s leaders are trying to prevent this outcome, to protect exporters’ interest, and because inflation is even more unpopular in China than it is elsewhere.  Don’t forget that it was inflation that fueled public discontent with the government, bore the 1989 protests in Tiananmen Square.

China is already hurting its citizens through financial controls.  For example, interest rates on bank deposits are limited to just 2.75 percent, which is below the official inflation rate of 4.9%.  Rapidly rising prices, even if matched by wage increases, are making the situation much worse for Chinese consumers.

Unfortunately, Beijing is not willing to deal with the root cause and let the RMB rise.  Instead, they are trying to control inflation by raising interest rates and restricting credit.  This is destructive for China, because credit limits are proving hard to enforce and are being further undermined by inflows of hot money from abroad.  With efforts to cool the economy falling short, China has been trying to limit inflation with price controls, which also rarely work.

Furthermore, this is destructive from a global point of view as well: with much of the world economy still depressed, the last thing the world needs is major players pursuing tight-money policies.  The solution to China’s monetary problem (and to the global recovery) is to let the currency rise!

But, any rebalancing efforts will face serious opposition from special interests domestically, primarily the State Owned Enterprises and regional and local officials.  The SOE’s benefit from lax environmental regulations, cheep energy and government subsidies, and an overall export led growth strategy.  On the other hand, local officials are not always willing to change, have old ideas about growth and tend to favor pet projects that need massive investments.  Couple that with China’s one-party state that refuses to do anything that looks like giving in to U.S. demands, and you have a recipe for certain continuation of the status-quo.

The focus of the new Five-Year-Plan is promising, but its success is questionable.

via chinatrade.foreignpolicyblogs.com

Very interesting...

Don’t Look For Jasmine Revolution Or Tea In China || YaleGlobal

Grounded: Chinese security in plain clothes deal with a foreign journalist hoping to cover the ‘Jasmine’ protest

HONG KONG: If you’re looking for good jasmine tea on Baidu, China’s biggest search engine, you may be in for a surprise. As soon as you type in “good jasmine tea,” Baidu flashes a message: “In accordance with relevant laws, regulations and policies, part of the search results are not shown.”

It’s not that the government discourages the tea, but the word “jasmine” has become toxic – even a song about the beautiful jasmine flower sung by Kenyan students along with President Hu Jintao is censored.

All this stems from the “Jasmine Revolution,” which began in Tunisia last December, leaped to Egypt and now spreads across North Africa and the Middle East. Beijing finds the fall of authoritarian governments in distant Africa embarrassing, recalling scenes of student-led protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989, crushed by the Chinese military.

There are attempts to launch “jasmine rallies” in China, although the anonymous online organizers have little to show for their efforts.

Even worse, there are attempts to launch “jasmine rallies” in China itself, although the organizers, who are anonymous and send messages online, have little to show for their efforts after three weeks. This may well be because China is more economically secure than the countries in the Arab world that are experiencing unrest. After all, it has gone through more than 30 years of rapid economic growth in which hundreds of millions of people have been lifted from poverty and people’s lives have improved dramatically.

In fact, a 22-nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey made public last June showed that while most people were unhappy with the direction of their country, China was an exception. “Only in China,” the survey reported, “does an overwhelming portion of the population (87%) express satisfaction with national conditions.”

So, on the face of it at least, China does not seem ripe for a Jasmine Revolution.

Those organizing “jasmine rallies” in China evidently think otherwise. In an open letter published on overseas website Boxun.com, the organizers called on people to gather every Sunday at 2 pm to demand an independent judiciary, a government supervised by the people and an end to corruption.

On February 20, it was difficult to tell protesters from shoppers since the designated sites in Beijing and Shanghai are busy shopping areas.

On February 20, the first Sunday, it was difficult to tell protesters from ordinary shoppers since the designated sites in Beijing and Shanghai are busy shopping areas, but the police were out in force, overwhelming foreign journalists out to cover the event, or non-event as it turned out to be. Before that day, the police had preempted any protest by rounding up more than 100 activists. Despite no signs of protest outside MacDonald’s on the busy Wangfujing shopping street, designated as the site for a rally in Beijing, police and security agents tried to stop the journalists from reporting.

Since the first protest was pretty much of a fizzle, one might have assumed that the Chinese authorities would relax. But the next Sunday there was an even bigger turnout of police and security agents who declared war on foreign journalists.

In one case, the Wall Street Journal reported, a Bloomberg television journalist was grabbed by five plainclothes officers, “dragged along the ground by his leg, punched in the head and beaten with a broomstick.” BBC footage showed plainclothes men roughing up the reporter and his colleague, throwing them into a van.

The police removed foreign news staff from the Associated Press, the BBC, Voice of American, German state broadcasters ARD and ZDF, and others from the scene.

Police ferocity was in sharp contrast to the behavior of protesters, told by rally organizers to participate by “strolling…or pretending to pass by.”

The New York Times reported that at least half a dozen journalists and photographers were visited in their homes, repeatedly warned not to cause trouble or, as one officer put it, try to “topple the party.”

Reporting rules were tightened. “No reporting” zones were established in Shanghai and Beijing. The Los Angeles Times reported that journalists were privately told that they could be expelled if caught reporting on protests without permission.

These moves constitute a big step backwards from the more moderate regulations for foreign correspondents introduced before the Beijing Olympics in 2008, which are theoretically still in force. The police ferocity was in sharp contrast to the behavior of protesters, told by rally organizers to participate by “strolling, watching or pretending to pass by” without shouting slogans or displaying placards.

The organizers, who remain anonymous, originally stipulated 13 cities for the rallies, which they quickly raised to 27 cities and, on March 6, claimed that their movement had spread to more than 100 cities. Since the only cities with a substantial presence of foreign journalists are Beijing and Shanghai, it’s impossible to verify such claims.

Reacting in such a disproportionate manner to mild forms of civil protest exposes a government that does not enjoy the trust of its people.

Moreover, because posts are typically immediately deleted on online message boards and  forums within China, it’s likely that few people in the country actually know about the call for defiance of the Communist authorities.

On March 6, the third Sunday, Beijing was quiet. But uniformed and plainclothes policemen were out in force in Wangfujing, Xidan and other crowded commercial areas.

Mobile phone service was shut down in parts of the city during the three Sundays.

The Chinese leadership evidently feels confronted with a dilemma: If they allow “strolling” to take place unhindered, then such gatherings will likely expand over time. If they clamp down hard, they may be seen as an illegitimate government able to stay in power only through force.

Clearly, China decided to crack down hard early so that a feeble movement does not gain strength.

In fact, budget figures disclosed on Saturday during the annual session of the National People’s Congress showed a sharp increase in funding for domestic security. For the first time, such expenditures exceed the amount spent on national defense.

Total budgeted spending for police, state security, armed civil militia, courts and jails amounted to 624 billion yuan, or US$95 billion, compared to 601.1 billion yuan, or $91.5 billion, for defense. Apparently, the government sees the domestic threat as being graver than any external threat despite the findings of  the Pew Survey.

In fact,  the government admits that people are unhappy. The China Daily, the official English-language daily, reported last week that a survey conducted by Gallup World Poll ranked China 125^th among 155 countries when measuring people’s overall satisfaction with their lives. The newspaper pointed out that “only 6 percent of Chinese people see themselves as happy” even though 36 percent of respondents said their lives had improved during the past five years.

Moreover, according to the government’s own statistics, unrest is widespread with the number of “mass incidents” rising in recent years and may now exceed 100,000 a year.

By all accounts, most people still have confidence in the central government, with which they rarely come into contact. But many have little confidence in officials at the local level, the people who seize their land, evict them from their homes to make deals with land developers and lock them up if they lodge petitions.

The way to respond to public dissatisfaction is to deal with legitimate grievances. Reacting in such a disproportionate manner to what’s at most a mild form of civil protest exposes a government that does not enjoy the trust of its people. And browbeating – actually beating – foreign reporters will result in that message being magnified rather than muffled.

Political stability maintained through coercive means may well result in political instability. China’s leaders should recall the saying of their founding father, Mao Zedong, “Where there is oppression there is resistance.”
 

via yaleglobal.yale.edu

Quick Notes from Beijing - James Fallows | The Atlantic

By James Fallows

Thanks very much to the latest guest team for their ongoing dispatches. Herewith, on a sanity break from other duties, some quick notes on what I first notice compared with my latest stint here last summer:

1) Pollution in Beijing itself has been as bad as the very worst I remember from the olden era. The view below (11am China time, Feb 23) has been more or less unvarying for the past four days. PM2.5 readings^[1] through that period have been steadily^[2] in the "hazardous" or "beyond index" category. I don't recall a stretch this bad, this long, before. Offered less as complaint than as reality check.

2) Prices are higher for everything, especially food. By Western standards they are of course very low. But by Western standards people's incomes are also very low. I see why there is so much talk about the disruptive effects of inflation. (Letting the RMB go up faster would help, but that's a topic for some other time.)

3) Internet blockages and social media interference seem worse than I remember experiencing between 2006 and 2009, except in the tensest Tibet-riot periods. Even VPNs^[3] sometimes don't work or are slow -- especially this past weekend when no one knew how serious the "Jasmine" demonstrations would become. To illustrate the difference this can make even if you're willing to shell out (as most Chinese citizens wouldn't be^[4]) $60 a year for a VPN to get around Great Firewall restrictions, here is a download screen showing progress on a file I was trying to save, from a server in the US:

If you can't read the small print, it's estimating 1 hour and 31 minutes to finish downloading a 34MB file. As it happened, shortly thereafter the connection improved and the file eventually loaded in "only" about eight minutes. But extrapolate that as an efficiency tax on the system as a whole. As I have mentioned many times, the whole setup here is quite an amazing combination of laissez-faire/chaos and cumbersome over-control. As many other people have mentioned, this is accompanied at the moment by a big media campaign^[5] pointing to the Middle East as an example of the kind of disorder China must avoid. The situation makes all the more startling the UN Security Council statement about Libya that China (along with other Permanent Members) approved yesterday:

>>The members of the Security Council underlined the need for the Government of Libya to respect the freedom of peaceful assembly and of expression, including freedom of the press. They called for the immediate lifting of restrictions on all forms of the media.<<

Emphasis mine, to indicate freedoms specifically not respected in China when inconvenient for the government and notably limited right at the moment. Lack of self-awareness on the government's part? Deciding that looking hypocritical was the lesser evil, versus standing alongside Qaddafi? Can't be sure.

4) Smiley curve. As mentioned in the magazine here^[6] and on this site here^[7], many "made in China" exports are actually mere repackaging of high-value components from Japan, Germany, Korea, the United States, or someplace else. China is a huge export power, but not as huge as it seems. Latest evidence in this McKinsey report^[8] (free registration required). It said that if you separate the "real" Chinese content from what is counted as total Chinese exports, exports accounted for only about 1/5th of the recent increase in China's GDP -- rather than 1/3, as most reports would suggest, or nearly 2/3rds, as reported a few years ago. China still has a big trade surplus; it still relies too much on exports for growth; its economy is still out of balance with the rest of the world's. But the picture is a little different from the way it's usually portrayed. Here's the main McKinsey chart showing export-growth as a share of Chinese GDP increase:

Back to typing, and back to this week's guests.

via theatlantic.com

China's reaction: Build a wall | The Economist

Build a wall

The Year of the Rabbit starts badly

China's reaction

Feb 3rd 2011 | BEIJING | from PRINT EDITION

THE Chinese Communist Party’s Publicity Department (or Propaganda Department, a closer rendering of the Chinese) is adept at controlling news from abroad that might inflame sentiment at home. As communism collapsed in Eastern Europe 20 years ago, it kept all but the barest news out of the domestic media, jammed foreign broadcasts and ordered vigilance over fax machines.

In response to the unrest in Egypt, the department has apparently instructed the Chinese media to use only dispatches sent by the official news agency, Xinhua, and either to bury news of events there or play up aspects that show the costs of turmoil. Reporting the travails of stranded Chinese tourists, or the government’s noble attempts to rescue them, is fine, but sympathy with the protesters is taboo. The department’s instructions to the media are, as usual, a secret, but their effect is clear.

The party has also been busy trying to control the internet. Twitter has been blocked in China since 2009, but home-grown versions are hugely popular. Anyone trying to follow postings by users with an interest in Egypt, however, might struggle. Merely searching for the word “Egypt” in Sina Weibo, one of China’s leading Twitter-like services, produces a warning that “according to the relevant laws, regulations and policies, the search results have not been displayed”. On Baidu, a big news portal, a prominent list of “hot search terms” includes “the return of compatriots stranded in Egypt”, but nothing else.

Related topics

• China
• Egypt

Chinese news reports have briefly mentioned the disruption of internet and mobile-phone services in Egypt. They have not, however, discussed China’s pioneering use of such techniques to impede the mobilisation of crowds. Use of the internet and mobile phones for international calls and text-messaging was cut off for months in the far-western region of Xinjiang after ethnic clashes there in 2009.

On February 1st the party’s main mouthpiece, the People’s Daily, relegated Egyptian politics to five terse paragraphs on page three but published a full page of articles under the headline, “The Internet is Warming the Whole of Society”. The internet, one scholar was quoted as saying, is a “great promoter of social change”. The party knows that all too well.

from PRINT EDITION | Briefing

via economist.com

Its always interesting to watch the Chinese media react to events with significant geopolitical implications because of the overt control over the media exerted by Beijing. Revolutions rarely carry the historical significance of these past weeks events in Eygpt, and the moment has clearly not been lost on the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party.

I cannot say that I totally understand why the Chinese political leaders fear such news making it into the hands and minds of the Chinese people. Its not as if the people aren't well aware that they are in control of the status quo in China, of course they understand that if they wanted a new government it would almost certainly be theirs to take. If anything, IMHO, the party is the chosen vehicle of the people as the fast means of achieving prestige and respect as a culture/civilization on the global stage.

Chinese detail ambitious space program in 2008

AP: China to Launch Rockets in Olympic Year



Wired Science: China Details 2008 Space Plans



The Chinese government has just released details of its planned space flights for 2008, leaving few to doubt the true emergence of a third player in the geo-political battle for control over near-Earth orbit. The boldest mission will be the third manned space flight launched by China and will feature the first spacewalk by a Chinese astronaut.



The much anticipated mission will be Shenzhou 7, and is slated for October. This will be a glorious time in Chinese history, provided the government can manage the seemingly impossible challenge of the Summer Olympics, and this human spacewalk will be the cherry on the proverbial sundae for the CCP leadership.

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2008 brings the reality of modern China to Western living rooms...

Image by kk+ via FlickrImage by kk+ via Flickr

For the last decade, China has been meticulously grooming its capital city, Beijing, for the curious eyes of eager Western consumers and potential business opportunities offered by the 2008 Summer Olympics. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has made grand promises of wealth and universal well-being to its vast citizenry, all of which hinge upon the near flawless production of the most anticipated event in the history of the Middle Kingdom.

Can the government contain the political powder-keg over which it rules? Will the world accept a Chinese superpower under Communist rule? History is hanging in the balance and nobody (least of all the CCP) knows what to expect in 2008, but I certainly look forward to sharing my thoughts on how America, and the West generally, should respond to the emergence of a more powerful and confident Chinese people.

I also welcome the submissions of papers, presentations, essays or videos anyone would like to contribute. Below I have embedded a great presentation compiled by a dear friend of mine, Victor Lang, who is a native of Hong Kong. Victor and I share many similar interests, such as China-Africa relations, international perception of Chinese politics, and domestic censorship by the CCP and corporations it intimidates to comply with their ridiculous media policies.

Happy New Year to all China Wakes readers and a toast to what will hopefully be remembered as the greatest year in the history of mankind's largest and oldest civilization.

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Americans are in no position to judge Chinese human rights...

Olympics Highlight Human Rights in China - washingtonpost.com

I used to think that I was a moral absolutist, and I would regularly dismiss my friends when they would attempt to justify something I considered "inhumane" as the position of a moral relativist, who sees fundamental differences in the way one human-being values the life of another based on cultural differences. It did not take long after I became interested in China for me to abandon my preconceived notions, which were likely the by-product of nearly two decades attending Catholic schools, and an attempt to more fully understand why it is that human life is not valued equally by all, or more importantly, why it cannot be such.

I always knew China was huge, but it never registered with me exactly how huge until I began studying the Chinese Communist Revolution and the major social movements subsequently led by Mao Zedong in an effort to "purge" his country of right-wing dissidents that may eventually pose a threat to the Communist Party's universal authority. The two largest massacres of human life in the 20th century were at the hands of Communist Chinese cadre, some of whom reverted to truly barbaric practices like cannibalism at the instigation of local and national party leaders. Literally tens-of-millions of Chinese citizens were murdered piecemeal during the "Long March" and "Cultural Revolution", yet still the country's population multiplied exponentially during the baby boom era. Growth was so amazing and untenable that the Party was forced to institute drastic population control laws, which we know as the "One Child Policy". Every living Chinese citizen has spent most, if not all, of their life in a fractured society built according to a strict social plan that harshly punished even the slightest deviation.



It is through the lens of this grossly incomplete history of 20th century Chinese growth and development that the West has chosen to judge the ethical standards of a civilization that makes up one-fifth of the worlds population, and has been wholly isolated from the world community until the last thirty years because of internal strife and political instability. I would never pretend that these are ideal circumstances from a Western perspective, or that these tragedies were unavoidable, but I believe it is essential that we not hold the common Chinese citizen responsible for the sins of paranoid men now but a memory. We must recognize that the Chinese people are aware of the differences between our cultures, and are ashamed of the history that we consider to be barbaric.



I have friends from China who comment to me often on how compassionate American culture is compared to their own. They can hardly believe it when they turn on the news to see 30 minutes of coverage on the investigation into the disappearance of one person, and they comment often on the propensity of Chinese media to completely ignore incidents such as floods, and poisonings of water reserves that literally kill whole towns of people in rural provinces.



I had a very difficult time trying to understand what the fundamental difference between the two civilizations that creates this culture of apathy on matters that we in America mourn daily as a nation. The value of each individual life in the US is truly held sacred by the media, which is largely due to the fact that these stories are the driving force behind stronger ratings because of the emotional response they elicit from viewers. Chinese media are much more interested in telling stories about great economic growth and massive engineering projects instead of the more emotionally charged stories, both because they cast the government in the most favorable light possible, and because this is what draws the attention and fascination of the average Chinese citizen.



You may be asking yourself, what is the underlying cause of this cultural divide? After much thought and reflection, I have reached two conclusions. First, Chinese society is essentially atheist, the antithesis of traditional American society, which has largely evolved from small communities built around the local church. Those who are deeply religious in China are absolutely in the minority, and their activities are viewed with great suspicion by the political classes of society because of the role religion has played historically in revolutionary political movements around the world. Secondly, the collective pride of Chinese society and the feelings of inferiority and lack of appreciation they have received from the more "developed" societies of the world, have created within the greater society a more focused and goal oriented vision of where their country is going and how progress toward that end earns them the respect they deserve around the world.



Though this narrow-minded, and less compassionate view on the world is largely the result of government suppression of dissent and censorship of news that serves as a distraction from Party plan, we should not be so jingoistic as to assume that we have any right or reason to pass judgment on a society that we should not even claim to understand. 1.5 billion human-beings is a staggering thought, and such circumstances are truly unprecedented in the history of nation-states.



To judge the undoubtedly complex and morally taxing decisions of the Communist Party Officials according to moral absolutes that we have concluded to be non-negotiable measures of social progress and worthiness of full diplomatic and economic recognition, is to me one of the most ignorant distortions of 21st century realities and further evidence of the poisonous opportunistic political culture that currently reigns in Washington. We cannot presume to understand the responsibility facing the Chinese Communist Party, and it is highly ignorant and dangerously presumptuous to arbitrarily decide that we can better judge the method of governance that is best for a country that in no way, demographically or ethically, resembles our own.



Continuing the movement to boycott the Beijing Olympics next summer is one of the most disturbing examples of political opportunism, worse than most because it is based on an assumption of clearly non-existent moral absolutisms. The only way to effect the social ethos of Chinese, or any other civilization, is to earn both their trust and respect. The more American politicians deride the "values" of our competitors, the greater the chances that mutual prosperity will fall victim to cultural resentment and unhealthy competition between the two greatest and most dynamic societies the world has ever known.



This was written in a stream of consciousness, so it may be fractured and incoherent. I would appreciate any comments that you may have so I can revise and clarify my thought. Thanks.

Tags: Beijing Olympics, Olympic Boycott, CCP, Chinese Civilization, Moral Relativism, Moral Absolutism

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